29 July 2026
Why the U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal is unlikely to expand South Korea's nuclear rights Different scales, different stakes A calculated hedge Tied at the Hill Separating power from proliferation
Korea JoongAng Daily - Daily News from Korea
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When the United States signed a civil nuclear cooperation deal with Saudi Arabia last week, it opened a door for Riyadh that it has kept shut for Seoul for half a century.
As South Korea conducts its own negotiations with Washington to secure uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing rights, the timing of the U.S.-Saudi accord has not gone unnoticed.
Thomas Countryman, who served as lead negotiator for the United States during the bilateral "123 agreement" renegotiations with Seoul from 2013 to 2015, described the U.S.-Saudi accord as a historic departure from American nonproliferation leadership.
"For the last 50 years, there have not been any exceptions made in 123 agreements until this Saudi agreement," Countryman told the Korea JoongAng Daily. "It is the first big reversal of policy and a reversal of leadership, because it opens the door for other countries to do the same thing with their friends."
The deal drew attention chiefly for appearing to carve out an exception to Washington's nonproliferation "gold standard" — the decades-old principle that foreign partners forgo domestic enrichment and reprocessing while accepting intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections.
Under the U.S.-Saudi agreement, Washington and Riyadh will spend two years studying whether uranium enrichment on Saudi soil is commercially viable. If approved, an American company would build and operate the facility. If deemed unviable, Saudi Arabia is barred from pursuing enrichment independently or with foreign partners for 10 years.
South Korea's presidential National Security Office reacted with cautious vigilance.
"We've been following this agreement with interest," National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac told reporters on July 22. "Even if it carries no direct implications for us, it could carry indirect ones."
On the surface, the Saudi deal could be seen as a hopeful sign — proof that the United States will now trade nonproliferation purity for strategic advantage, which could work in South Korea's favor.
But South Korean officials and nuclear experts aren't so sure. Seoul's nuclear sector operates on a vastly different scale, under entirely different geopolitical stakes.
South Korea's nuclear partnership with Washington is governed by a bilateral "123 agreement," named after Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act.
Under its current terms, Seoul must obtain Washington's written consent before it can enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel — a restriction that has held firm even as South Korea built one of the world's largest civilian nuclear sectors.
South Korea operates 26 domestic reactors and powers a broader network requiring fuel for roughly 40 reactors when accounting for export projects. That operational track record gives Seoul a compelling economic case for domestic fuel-cycle rights — one far stronger than Saudi Arabia, which has yet to turn on its first commercial reactor.
"Because South Korea's and Saudi Arabia's civilian nuclear industries are at fundamentally different stages of development, a simple side-by-side comparison is difficult," a senior Foreign Ministry official said during a closed-door briefing on Tuesday.
The official emphasized that any future enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia would be built, run and strictly controlled by U.S. companies — a U.S.-managed "black box" arrangement. The U.S. Department of Energy explicitly framed the agreement as a vehicle to secure a vital foothold for American vendors, such as Westinghouse, in the nascent Saudi reactor market.
South Korea's nuclear cooperation talks with the United States, led by chief negotiator Lim Kap-soo, are not seeking a foreign-managed facility. Seoul wants the right to operate and control indigenous fuel-cycle facilities.
That distinction is critical.
Washington felt comfortable offering a foreign-managed arrangement to a dependent partner with no existing commercial reactors. Granting similar rights to South Korea, however, would cr...
As South Korea conducts its own negotiations with Washington to secure uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing rights, the timing of the U.S.-Saudi accord has not gone unnoticed.
Thomas Countryman, who served as lead negotiator for the United States during the bilateral "123 agreement" renegotiations with Seoul from 2013 to 2015, described the U.S.-Saudi accord as a historic departure from American nonproliferation leadership.
"For the last 50 years, there have not been any exceptions made in 123 agreements until this Saudi agreement," Countryman told the Korea JoongAng Daily. "It is the first big reversal of policy and a reversal of leadership, because it opens the door for other countries to do the same thing with their friends."
The deal drew attention chiefly for appearing to carve out an exception to Washington's nonproliferation "gold standard" — the decades-old principle that foreign partners forgo domestic enrichment and reprocessing while accepting intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections.
Under the U.S.-Saudi agreement, Washington and Riyadh will spend two years studying whether uranium enrichment on Saudi soil is commercially viable. If approved, an American company would build and operate the facility. If deemed unviable, Saudi Arabia is barred from pursuing enrichment independently or with foreign partners for 10 years.
South Korea's presidential National Security Office reacted with cautious vigilance.
"We've been following this agreement with interest," National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac told reporters on July 22. "Even if it carries no direct implications for us, it could carry indirect ones."
On the surface, the Saudi deal could be seen as a hopeful sign — proof that the United States will now trade nonproliferation purity for strategic advantage, which could work in South Korea's favor.
But South Korean officials and nuclear experts aren't so sure. Seoul's nuclear sector operates on a vastly different scale, under entirely different geopolitical stakes.
South Korea's nuclear partnership with Washington is governed by a bilateral "123 agreement," named after Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act.
Under its current terms, Seoul must obtain Washington's written consent before it can enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel — a restriction that has held firm even as South Korea built one of the world's largest civilian nuclear sectors.
South Korea operates 26 domestic reactors and powers a broader network requiring fuel for roughly 40 reactors when accounting for export projects. That operational track record gives Seoul a compelling economic case for domestic fuel-cycle rights — one far stronger than Saudi Arabia, which has yet to turn on its first commercial reactor.
"Because South Korea's and Saudi Arabia's civilian nuclear industries are at fundamentally different stages of development, a simple side-by-side comparison is difficult," a senior Foreign Ministry official said during a closed-door briefing on Tuesday.
The official emphasized that any future enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia would be built, run and strictly controlled by U.S. companies — a U.S.-managed "black box" arrangement. The U.S. Department of Energy explicitly framed the agreement as a vehicle to secure a vital foothold for American vendors, such as Westinghouse, in the nascent Saudi reactor market.
South Korea's nuclear cooperation talks with the United States, led by chief negotiator Lim Kap-soo, are not seeking a foreign-managed facility. Seoul wants the right to operate and control indigenous fuel-cycle facilities.
That distinction is critical.
Washington felt comfortable offering a foreign-managed arrangement to a dependent partner with no existing commercial reactors. Granting similar rights to South Korea, however, would cr...