11 November 2026
Flawed but final? Privy Council declines to set aside Bahamian trustee's appointments despite breach A family fortune – and a family falling-out What was before the Board? What did the settlor want? Breach first, consequences second Was there a breach? Why did the appointments survive? Wider relevance
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A trustee who falls short in its deliberations will not necessarily see its decision unwound. That is the message from the Privy Council on appeal from the Bahamas. In Dawson-Damer v Grampian Trust Company, the Board found that the trustee had breached its duty of proper consideration – but still refused to set aside appointments worth over US$400 million.
The decision is to be welcomed. It does not represent a radical break from tradition. Rather, it affirms orthodoxy on trustee decision-making, while offering clear, practical guidance in two areas: (a) how the wishes of a corporate settlor are identified; and (b) the two-stage approach the court must take when a decision is challenged for "inadequate deliberation".
The dispute concerned the Glenfinnan Settlement, a Bahamian discretionary family trust. Its assets could be traced back to George Skelton Yuill, a Scotsman who made his fortune in beef and butter in Australia and the Far East.
Following a restructuring in 1992, the settlor of Glenfinnan was a Bahamian company, Spey. Grampian was the sole trustee.
Ashley Dawson-Damer was a discretionary beneficiary. She was the widow of John Dawson-Damer, one of Mr Yuill's great-grandsons. After John's death in 2000, relations between Ashley and the family advisers soured – and, ultimately – became acrimonious.
In 2006 and 2009, Grampian appointed around 98 per cent of the Glenfinnan assets into new trusts for the descendants of John's brother, George. Ashley was not a beneficiary of the new trusts, and was not consulted. Around 2 per cent was held back in Glenfinnan as a "safety net" for her. By the time of the appeal, that sum had grown to around US$14 million.
Ashley sought to set the appointments aside. Her claim failed before Justice Winder at first instance, and again before the Court of Appeal.
Two issues were before the Board:
1.
whether the lower courts had applied the wrong test in attributing to Spey the wish that the Glenfinnan assets be used for future generations; and
2.
whether there had been a breach of duty by inadequate deliberation – and, if so, what followed from it.
Lord Burrows and Lady Rose gave the judgment of the Board.
It was common ground that a settlor's wishes are a relevant factor which a trustee must take into account. As the UK Supreme Court made clear in Pitt v Holt, those wishes are always a material consideration – but they should not displace all of the trustee's independent judgement. Nor do they need to be set out in a formal letter of wishes.
The twist here was that the settlor was a company. Both sides accepted that Spey's wishes had to be identified using the ordinary corporate attribution rules; the directing mind of Spey for this purpose was a majority of the three directors. Ashley argued that the judge never found that a majority of Spey's board had formed the relevant wish. She said there was no such evidence. The documents and witness evidence relied on came from others, such as the family advisers and the family's solicitor, and not from Spey's board.
The Board disagreed. It held that the judge had applied the correct test, and that he was entitled to infer the board's wish from the evidence before him. A board decision does not have to be formally adopted and minuted in order to be attributed to a company. The typed minutes of Spey's board meeting did not record the "next generation" purpose – but handwritten notes described the Glenfinnan share as a "long term fund". All three Spey directors had died by the time of trial, so there was an obvious gap in the evidence. The first instance judge was entitled to fill that gap by drawing inferences from the oral evidence and the documents, both contemporaneous and later.
On the second issue, the Board restated the law laid down in Pitt v Holt. The court may only intervene on the basis of inadequate deliberation where there has been a breach of fiduciary duty. The inadequate deliberation must be sufficiently serious – it is not enough th...
The decision is to be welcomed. It does not represent a radical break from tradition. Rather, it affirms orthodoxy on trustee decision-making, while offering clear, practical guidance in two areas: (a) how the wishes of a corporate settlor are identified; and (b) the two-stage approach the court must take when a decision is challenged for "inadequate deliberation".
The dispute concerned the Glenfinnan Settlement, a Bahamian discretionary family trust. Its assets could be traced back to George Skelton Yuill, a Scotsman who made his fortune in beef and butter in Australia and the Far East.
Following a restructuring in 1992, the settlor of Glenfinnan was a Bahamian company, Spey. Grampian was the sole trustee.
Ashley Dawson-Damer was a discretionary beneficiary. She was the widow of John Dawson-Damer, one of Mr Yuill's great-grandsons. After John's death in 2000, relations between Ashley and the family advisers soured – and, ultimately – became acrimonious.
In 2006 and 2009, Grampian appointed around 98 per cent of the Glenfinnan assets into new trusts for the descendants of John's brother, George. Ashley was not a beneficiary of the new trusts, and was not consulted. Around 2 per cent was held back in Glenfinnan as a "safety net" for her. By the time of the appeal, that sum had grown to around US$14 million.
Ashley sought to set the appointments aside. Her claim failed before Justice Winder at first instance, and again before the Court of Appeal.
Two issues were before the Board:
1.
whether the lower courts had applied the wrong test in attributing to Spey the wish that the Glenfinnan assets be used for future generations; and
2.
whether there had been a breach of duty by inadequate deliberation – and, if so, what followed from it.
Lord Burrows and Lady Rose gave the judgment of the Board.
It was common ground that a settlor's wishes are a relevant factor which a trustee must take into account. As the UK Supreme Court made clear in Pitt v Holt, those wishes are always a material consideration – but they should not displace all of the trustee's independent judgement. Nor do they need to be set out in a formal letter of wishes.
The twist here was that the settlor was a company. Both sides accepted that Spey's wishes had to be identified using the ordinary corporate attribution rules; the directing mind of Spey for this purpose was a majority of the three directors. Ashley argued that the judge never found that a majority of Spey's board had formed the relevant wish. She said there was no such evidence. The documents and witness evidence relied on came from others, such as the family advisers and the family's solicitor, and not from Spey's board.
The Board disagreed. It held that the judge had applied the correct test, and that he was entitled to infer the board's wish from the evidence before him. A board decision does not have to be formally adopted and minuted in order to be attributed to a company. The typed minutes of Spey's board meeting did not record the "next generation" purpose – but handwritten notes described the Glenfinnan share as a "long term fund". All three Spey directors had died by the time of trial, so there was an obvious gap in the evidence. The first instance judge was entitled to fill that gap by drawing inferences from the oral evidence and the documents, both contemporaneous and later.
On the second issue, the Board restated the law laid down in Pitt v Holt. The court may only intervene on the basis of inadequate deliberation where there has been a breach of fiduciary duty. The inadequate deliberation must be sufficiently serious – it is not enough th...