Paris Perspective #24: On thin ice - Europe, Ukraine and a new Cold War - Marie Dumoulin

It seems that every move Russian President Vladimir Putin makes has Western powers ever more perplexed as to what his intentions are when it comes to Ukraine. As French president Emmanuel Macron embarks on a diplomatic mission to Moscow and Kyiv, Paris Perspective looks at what's at stake amid the standoff between the Kremlin and its Cold War adversaries, and if France can deliver a solution. 

Following a flurry of high-level diplomatic talks throughout January – from Geneva to Brussels, to Vienna and Paris – the meetings achieved next to nothing and Russia continues its military build-up on Ukraine’s eastern border.

This Monday, Macron kicks-off a whirlwind tour of lightning diplomacy to Moscow and Kyiv, playing multiple roles: international mediator, level-headed negotiator and de facto leader of the European Union. 

It's a heavy, hydra-headed performance for even the most seasoned political player in their prime, let alone a 44-year-old rookie looking to secure a second, five-year mandate this April. 

Macron's latest attempts to lower tensions between Putin and Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky are, however, consistent with the two main features of French foreign policy since he came to power in 2017.

'Diplomacy of audacity' vs realpolitik

Macron has always argued the European Union should take greater charge of its own defence and security, and has sought to push France forward on the international stage with what he describes as a "diplomacy of audacity".

However, his noble efforts at deal brokering to date have not borne fruit: Libya is still in chaos, Iran continues its uranium enrichment and Lebanon's political system is as byzantine as ever – despite Macron's good intentions. 

Yet with France holding the rotating EU presidency, Macron's diplomatic intervention may pack a bigger punch when he hits the tarmac in Moscow. 

As he wades into the fray, one of the first points of rhetoric to be addressed relates to a 1999 agreement between Russia and Western governments that states that "no country can strengthen its own security at the expense of others".

This is a key issue that Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov maintains is at the heart of the Ukraine crisis, amid Russian fears of Nato expansion. 

Instead of dealing with the EU as a whole, Russia has appealed to individual states who were signatories to the document to test the temperature.

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Divide and conquer?

So is Russia actively trying to undercut the European bloc by appealing to individual states bilaterally, in a bid to further divide a fractured Europe? 

Marie Dumoulin director of the Wider Europe programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations, says Russia's overtures are open to interpretation. 

"Yes, it's probably a way to feed divisions among Western countries, and not only the European Union but all the Western allies. But you also have a very legalistic vision of this [approach].

"These countries signed up to these commitments as OSCE participating states. And the OSCE is not the kind of coherent organisation like the EU or Nato. So it's really as individual states that these commitments have been signed. And that's why he addresses them individually," Dumoulin explains. 

But to counter this rhetoric, the OSCE charter says countries should be free to choose their own security arrangements and alliances. And Ukraine's right to choose whether to join Nato or not is central to the current standoff with Moscow.

Does that not, in itself, undercut any Russian complaints of self-determination when looking for international recognition of Ukraine's separatist regions, such as Luhansk and Donetsk? 

Hypocritical perhaps. Paradoxical? Definitely, says Dumoulin: "Russia is saying you're not respecting this commitment that security should not be guaranteed at the expense of the security of another state.

"But at the same time, Moscow pressures Ukraine and the West by threatening Ukraine's security. So it's doing what it reproaches the West of doing.

"Another paradox is that Russia is appealing to this 1999 OSCE declaration, but at the same meeting, Russia made commitments to withdraw its troops from a number of territories where they are stationed – including Transdniestria and Georgia at the time," Dumoulin underlines. 

Nato in post-Soviet Europe

Ukraine was not of concern when the 1999 accord was signed, but it it can be considered as another example of a "Russian presence" without the compliance of a neighbouring country.

Since the escalation of the latest post-Cold War expansion spat, the finger pointing has gone both ways, with the steady absorbtion of former Soviet states into the military alliance over the past 20 years. 

There is indeed controversy over Nato encroachment into Russia's sphere of influence, says Dumoulin, especially over what promises Nato actually gave Moscow at the time. 

"Russia says there was a clear promise back in the 1990s, that Nato would not expand, and there is this 1997 act and they want to go back to this period.

"At the same time, Nato countries say there was never a clear commitment not to expand and expansion has been also a consequence of Russia's behaviour.

"Neighbouring countries need to have some sort of security guarantees," Dumoulin adds. "And if Georgia and Ukraine want to join Nato, it's precisely because they feel threatened by Russia."

Securing Europe's place at the table

Many of Macron's detractors say the young president is naive about France's status on the international stage, failing to grasp the country's limitations as a middle-ranking world power.

So taking on board what is at the centre of the maelstrom, and the self-righteous interpretations that can be used as ammunition on both sides of the dispute, can Macron's diplomacy prevail where previous negotiations floundered? 

Dumoulin remarks that initially Russia only wanted to deal with the US and wasn't interested in engaging with the EU.

"They didn't want to start or launch new talks in the framework of the Normandy Format, where France and Germany play a mediation role," she says.

"Now, it seems that they have changed their approach and they accepted a first meeting of the Normandy Format in Paris recently ... And definitely Putin has talked to a number of European leaders – among them Macron – with whom he's had regular contact for the last five years."

Since Chancellor Merkel left office, Dumoulin concludes: "Macron is probably one of the European leaders who has the closest relationship with Putin, so he's trying to make use of this relationship, whether it brings added value and allows for de-escalation? It remains to be seen."

Watch full video here

Written, produced and presented by David Coffey.

Recorded and edited by Vincent Pora and Erwan Rome.

Marie Dumoulin is the director of the Wider Europe programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations' Paris bureau.