Financial Crisis Inquiry Report

Chapters

1. Chapter 1

   Preface

   08:03
2. Chapter 2

   Conclusions of the Commission

   38:05
3. Chapter 3

   Conclusions of the Commission, concluded

   22:59
4. Chapter 4

   Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 1

   38:26
5. Chapter 5

   Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 2

   45:54
6. Chapter 6

   Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 3

   17:57
7. Chapter 7

   Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: Commercial Paper and Repos

   30:09
8. Chapter 8

   Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: The Savings and Loan Crisis

   18:16
9. Chapter 9

   Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

   20:26
10. Chapter 10

    Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Structured Finance

    12:11
11. Chapter 11

    Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: The Growth of Derivatives

    25:53
12. Chapter 12

    Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Expansion of Banking Activities

    19:24
13. Chapter 13

    Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Long-Term Capital Management

    12:00
14. Chapter 14

    Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Dot-Com Crash

    12:11
15. Chapter 15

    Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: The Wages of Finance

    13:26
16. Chapter 16

    Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Financial Sector Growth

    08:47
17. Chapter 17

    Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Mortgage Securitization

    17:04
18. Chapter 18

    Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Greater Access to Lending

    06:19
19. Chapter 19

    Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Subprime Lenders in Turmoil

    05:33
20. Chapter 20

    Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: The Regulators

    19:20
21. Chapter 21

    Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Housing, A Powerful Stabilizing Force

    19:39
22. Chapter 22

    Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Subprime Loans, Buyers Will Pay A Premium

    18:12
23. Chapter 23

    Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Citigroup: Invited Regulatory Scrutiny

    04:42
24. Chapter 24

    Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Federal Rules: Intended to Curb Unfair or Abusive Lending

    12:52
25. Chapter 25

    Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. States: Long-Standing Position

    04:02
26. Chapter 26

    Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Community-Lending Pledges: What We Do Is Reaffirm Our Intention"

    10:44
27. Chapter 27

    Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Bank Capital Standards: "Arbitrage"

    05:45
28. Chapter 28

    Ch. 6. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 6

    01:18
29. Chapter 29

    Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. An Irresistible Profit Opportunity

    10:21
30. Chapter 30

    Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Mortgages: A Good Loan

    32:56
31. Chapter 31

    Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Federal Regulators: Immunity from Many State Laws is a Significant Benefit

    06:49
32. Chapter 32

    Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Wall Street Was Very Hungry For Our Product

    17:23
33. Chapter 33

    Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Moody's: Given A Blank Check

    16:09
34. Chapter 34

    Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Less Competition in the Marketplace

    13:09
35. Chapter 35

    Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 7

    03:24
36. Chapter 36

    Ch. 8. The CDO Machine

    07:50
37. Chapter 37

    Ch. 8. We Created the Investor

    22:21
38. Chapter 38

    Ch. 8. Bear Stearns' Hedge Funds: It Functioned Fine Up Until One Day It Just Didn't Function

    10:33
39. Chapter 39

    Ch. 8. Citigroup's Liquidity puts: A Potential Conflict of Interest

    10:51
40. Chapter 40

    Ch. 8. AIG:Golden Goose for the Entire Street

    10:28
41. Chapter 41

    Ch. 8. Goldman Sachs: Multiplied the Effects of the Collapse in Subprime

    17:16
42. Chapter 42

    Ch. 8. Moody's: Achieved Through Some Alchemy

    18:33
43. Chapter 43

    Ch. 8. SEC: It's Going to be an Awfully Big Mess

    19:27
44. Chapter 44

    Commission Conclusions on Chapter 8

    02:55
45. Chapter 45

    Chapter 9. The Bubble, "A Credit-induced Boom"

    15:00
46. Chapter 46

    Mortgage Fraud: Crime-facilitative environments

    22:31
47. Chapter 47

    Disclosure and due diligence: A Quality Control Issue in the Factory

    24:27
48. Chapter 48

    Regulators: markets will always self-correct

    14:56
49. Chapter 49

    Leveraged Loans and Commercial Real Estate: You've Got to Get Up and Dance

    11:08
50. Chapter 50

    Lehman: From Moving to Storage

    07:47
51. Chapter 51

    Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Two Stark Choices

    11:36
52. Chapter 52

    2006: Increase Our Penetration into Subprime. 2007: Moving deeper into the credit pool

    12:30
53. Chapter 53

    Affordable housing goals: "GSEs cried bloody murder forever." The impact of the goals

    17:05
54. Chapter 54

    Commission Conclusions on Chapter 9

    01:39
55. Chapter 55

    Ch. 10. CDO Managers: "We Are Not A Rent-A-Manager"

    09:52
56. Chapter 56

    Ch. 10. Credit Default Swaps: "Dumb Question"

    24:17
57. Chapter 57

    Citigroup: "I Do Not Believe We Were Powerless"

    18:04
58. Chapter 58

    AIG: "I'm Not Getting Paid Enough to Stand on These Tracks"

    08:42
59. Chapter 59

    Merrill Lynch: "Whatever It Takes"

    12:28
60. Chapter 60

    Regulators: "Are Undue Concentrations of Risk Developing?"

    07:29
61. Chapter 61

    Moody's: "It Was All About Revenue"

    23:34
62. Chapter 62

    Commission Conclusions on Chapter 10

    02:20
63. Chapter 63

    Ch. 11. The Bust. Delinquencies: "The Turn of the Housing Market"

    29:56
64. Chapter 64

    Ch. 11. Rating Downgrades: "Never Before"

    08:04
65. Chapter 65

    Ch. 11. CDOs: "Climbing the Wall of Subprime Lending"

    04:50
66. Chapter 66

    Ch. 11. Legal Remedies: "On the Basis of the Information"

    10:10
67. Chapter 67

    Ch. 11. Losses: "Who Owns Residential Credit Risk?"

    13:22
68. Chapter 68

    Commission Conclusions on Ch. 11

    02:33
69. Chapter 69

    Early 2007: Spreading Subprime Worries

    07:02
70. Chapter 70

    Ch. 12. Goldman: Let's be Aggressive

    13:59
71. Chapter 71

    Bear Stearns's Hedge Funds

    16:01
72. Chapter 72

    Rating Agencies

    04:27
73. Chapter 73

    AIG: Well Bigger

    07:39
74. Chapter 74

    Commission Conclusions on Ch. 12

    00:56
75. Chapter 75

    Chapter 13 Summer 2007: Disruptions in Funding Intro

    02:06
76. Chapter 76

    Ch 13 IKB of Germany "Real Money Investors"

    05:42
77. Chapter 77

    Ch 13 Countrywide: "That's our 9/11"

    08:29
78. Chapter 78

    Ch 13 BNP Paribas: "The ringing of the bells"

    04:40
79. Chapter 79

    Ch 13 SIVs: "An Oasis of Calm"

    04:04
80. Chapter 80

    Ch 13 Money funds and other investors: "Drink[ing] from a fire hose"

    06:19
81. Chapter 81

    Commission conclusions on Chapter 13

    01:39
82. Chapter 82

    Chapter 14 Late 2007 to early 2008: Billions in subprime losses (Intro)

    02:42
83. Chapter 83

    Ch 14 Merrill Lynch: "Dawining awareness over the course of the summer"

    11:50
84. Chapter 84

    Ch 14 Citigroup: "That would not in any way have excited my attention"

    22:26
85. Chapter 85

    Ch 14 AIG's dispute with Goldman: "There could never be losses"

    32:30
86. Chapter 86

    Ch 14 Federal Reserve: "The discount window wasn't working"

    07:47
87. Chapter 87

    Ch 14 Monoline Insurers: "We never expected losses"

    09:16
88. Chapter 88

    Commission Conclusions on Chapter 14

    01:15
89. Chapter 89

    Chapter 15 March 2008: The fall of Bear Stearns (Intro)

    03:48
90. Chapter 90

    Ch 15 "I requested some forbearance"

    04:06
91. Chapter 91

    Ch 15 "We were suitably skeptical"

    03:56
92. Chapter 92

    Ch 15 "Turn into a death spiral"

    09:15
93. Chapter 93

    Ch 15 "Duty to protect their investors"

    11:06
94. Chapter 94

    Ch 15 "The Government would not permit a higher number"

    04:42
95. Chapter 95

    Ch 15 "It was heading to a black hole"

    02:49
96. Chapter 96

    Commission Conclusions on Chapter 15

    01:16
97. Chapter 97

    Chapter 16 March to August 2008: Systemic Risk Concerns (Intro)

    02:38
98. Chapter 98

    Ch 16 The Federal Reserve: "When people got scared"

    08:36
99. Chapter 99

    Ch 16 JP Morgan: "Refusing to unwind...would be unforgiveable"

    05:16
100. Chapter 100

     Ch 16 The Fed and the SEC: "Weak liquidity position"

     07:39
101. Chapter 101

     Ch 16 Derivatives: "Early stages of assessing the potential systemic risk"

     07:12
102. Chapter 102

     Ch 16 Banks: "The markets were really, really dicey"

     26:35
103. Chapter 103

     Commission Conclusions on Chapter 16

     01:19
104. Chapter 104

     Chapter 17 September 2008: The takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Intro)

     03:28
105. Chapter 105

     Ch 17 "A good time to buy"

     05:04
106. Chapter 106

     Ch 17 "The only game in town"

     03:30
107. Chapter 107

     Ch 17 "It's a time game...be cool"

     06:38
108. Chapter 108

     Ch 17 "The idea strikes me as perverse"

     03:58
109. Chapter 109

     Ch 17 "It will increase confidence"

     08:45
110. Chapter 110

     Ch 17 "Critical unsafe and unsound practices"

     06:22
111. Chapter 111

     Ch 17 "They went from zero to three with no warning in between"

     07:31
112. Chapter 112

     Ch 17 "The worst-run financial institution"

     03:37
113. Chapter 113

     Ch 17 "Wasn't done at my pay grade"

     01:16
114. Chapter 114

     Commission Conclusions on Chapter 17

     02:26
115. Chapter 115

     Chapter 18 September 2008: The bankruptcy of Lehman (Intro)

     04:37
116. Chapter 116

     Ch 18 "Get more conservatively funded"

     07:17
117. Chapter 117

     Ch 18 "This is not sounding good at all"

     03:38
118. Chapter 118

     Ch 18 "Spook the market"

     11:07
119. Chapter 119

     Ch 18 "Imagination hat"

     08:19
120. Chapter 120

     Ch 18 "Heads of family"

     03:38
121. Chapter 121

     Ch 18 "Tell those sons of bitches to unwind"

     03:20
122. Chapter 122

     Ch 18 "This doesn't seem like it is going to end pretty"

     08:02
123. Chapter 123

     Ch 18 "The only alternative was that Lehman had to fail"

     03:48
124. Chapter 124

     Ch 18 "A calamity"

     12:42
125. Chapter 125

     Commission Conclusions on Chapter 18

     02:30
126. Chapter 126

     Chapter 19 September 2008: The bailout of AIG (Intro)

     05:14
127. Chapter 127

     Ch 19 "Current liquidity position is precarious"

     06:56
128. Chapter 128

     Ch 19 "Spillover effect"

     10:50
129. Chapter 129

     Ch 19 "Like a gnat on an elephant"

     05:18
130. Chapter 130

     Commission Conclusions on Chapter 19

     03:07
131. Chapter 131

     Chapter 20 Crisis and Panic (Intro)

     07:45
132. Chapter 132

     Ch 20 Money market funds: "Dealers weren't even picking up their phones"

     10:36
133. Chapter 133

     Ch 20 Morgan Stanley: "Now we're the next in line"

     13:07
134. Chapter 134

     Ch 20 Over-the-counter derivatives "A grinding halt"

     06:26
135. Chapter 135

     Ch 20 Washington Mutual "It's yours"

     04:16
136. Chapter 136

     Ch 20 Wachovia "At the front end of teh dominoes as other dominoes fell"

     18:26
137. Chapter 137

     Ch 20 TARP "Comprehensive approach"

     18:03
138. Chapter 138

     Ch 20 AIG "We needed to stop the sucking chest wound in this patient"

     10:19
139. Chapter 139

     Ch 20 Citigroup "Let the world know we will not pull a Lehman"

     11:15
140. Chapter 140

     Ch 20 Bank of America "A shotgun wedding"

     13:17
141. Chapter 141

     Commission Conclusions on Chapter 20

     02:45
142. Chapter 142

     Chapter 21 The Economic Fallout (Intro)

     04:17
143. Chapter 143

     Ch 21 Households "I'm not eating, I'm not sleeping"

     12:15
144. Chapter 144

     Ch 21 Businesses "Squirrels storing nuts"

     09:54
145. Chapter 145

     Ch 21 Commercial real estate: "Nothing's moving"

     05:09
146. Chapter 146

     Ch 21 Government: "State struggled to close shortfalls"

     08:06
147. Chapter 147

     Ch 21 The financial sector: "Almost triple the level of three years earlier"

     03:18
148. Chapter 148

     Ch 22 Foreclosures on the rise: "Hard to talk about any recovery"

     06:39
149. Chapter 149

     Ch 22 Initiatives to stem foreclosures "Persistently disregard"

     06:37
150. Chapter 150

     Ch 22 Flaws in the process: "Speculation and worst-case scenarios"

     05:39
151. Chapter 151

     Ch 22 Neighborhood effects: "I'm not leaving"

     05:26
152. Chapter 152

     Commission Conclusions on Chapter 22

     01:01
153. Chapter 153

     Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Intro

     01:19
154. Chapter 154

     Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - How our approach differs from others?

     07:09
155. Chapter 155

     Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Stages of the crisis

     02:26
156. Chapter 156

     Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The ten essential causes of the financial and economic crisis

     06:10
157. Chapter 157

     Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The credit bubble: global capita flows, underpriced risk, and Federal Reserve policy

     08:30
158. Chapter 158

     Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The housing bubble

     08:35
159. Chapter 159

     Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Turning bad mortgages into toxic financial assets

     07:28
160. Chapter 160

     Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Big bank bets and why banks failed

     09:32
161. Chapter 161

     Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Two types of systemic failure

     13:52
162. Chapter 162

     Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The shock and panic

     06:39
163. Chapter 163

     Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The system freezing

     03:50
164. Chapter 164

     Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Intro

     23:30
165. Chapter 165

     Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Summary

     07:41
166. Chapter 166

     Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 1. Government policies resulted in an unprecedented number of risky mortgages

     15:59
167. Chapter 167

     Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 2. The great housing bubble and its effects

     13:03
168. Chapter 168

     Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 3. Delinquency rates on nontraditional mortgages

     04:20
169. Chapter 169

     Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 4. The origin and growth of subprime PMBS

     07:58
170. Chapter 170

     Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 5. What was known about NTMs prior to the crisis?

     17:17
171. Chapter 171

     Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 6. Conclusion

     04:40
172. Chapter 172

     Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - Intro

     03:26
173. Chapter 173

     Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - How failures among NTMs were transmitted to the financial system

     03:21
174. Chapter 174

     Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - The defaults begin

     34:12
175. Chapter 175

     Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - Intro

     09:00
176. Chapter 176

     Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 1. HUD's central role

     07:34
177. Chapter 177

     Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 2. The decline of mortgage underwriting standards

     35:58
178. Chapter 178

     Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 1

     27:41
179. Chapter 179

     Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 2

     28:32
180. Chapter 180

     Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 4. Competition between the GSEs and FHA for subprime and alt-a mortgages

     10:15
181. Chapter 181

     Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 5. Enlisting mortgage bankers and subprime lenders in affordable housing

     05:10
182. Chapter 182

     Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 6. The community reinvestment act

     22:13
183. Chapter 183

     Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - IV. Conclusion

     02:37